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ABSTRACT 
 
Some works of conceptual art require deception for their appreciation—deception of the 
viewer of the work. Some experiments in social psychology equally require deception—
deception of the participants in the experiment. There are a number of close parallels between 
the two kinds of deception. And yet, in spite of these parallels, the art world, artists, and 
philosophers of art, do not seem to be troubled about the deception involved, whereas 
deception is a constant source of worry for social psychologists. Intuitively, each of these 
responses might seem appropriate for its sphere, but it is not easy to see what grounds these 
intuitions. I try to come up with some answers.  
 
I 
 
Some experiments (indeed the majority) in social psychology require deception. Stanley 
Milgram’s obedience experiments are perhaps the most famous example, where participants 
were deceived into believing that they were involved in a learning test, giving real electric shocks 
to people, when in fact they were involved in experiments on obedience, and the shocks 
weren’t real. 1 In one of J. M. Darley and C. D. Batson’s experiments, seminarians were 
1  See especially Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, New York: Harper and 
33 
PETER GOLDIE 
induced to believe that one of their number, whom they encountered in a walk across the 
campus to give a talk, was seriously ill, when in fact he was not, and in fact they were, unknown 
to them, part of an experiment in Samaritarianism—the study of people’s helping behaviour.2 
The deception was so effective that one of the seminarians, on his way to give a talk on the 
parable on the Good Samaritan, actually stepped over the prone body of what he thought to be 
his suffering colleague. 
It’s a little observed fact that some works of conceptual art also involve deception.3 Here are 
two examples. 
In September 2002 invitations were sent out to members of the art scene to attend the 
opening of the £500,000 extension of the Lisson Gallery in Bell Street in London. When the 
guests turned up, ready for their champagne and canapés, what they found instead was that the 
whole of the front of the gallery was boarded up by a large expanse of corrugated iron, with no 
means of entrance. The guests were at first puzzled, and then many of them became angry and 
frustrated at being shut out. Finally, the artist, Santiago Sierra, emerged and told them that this 
was the exhibit, called Space Closed by Corrugated Metal. Sierra is quoted in The Guardian 
as saying: ‘It was part of a broader work which is a commentary on frustration at not being able 
to get in somewhere for economic or political reasons.’ The Guardian continues: ‘It was 
prompted by events in Argentina, where, following the collapse of the peso, banks pulled 
corrugated sheets across their buildings to stop people from withdrawing their savings’.4  
The second example is by a group that are now called the Leeds 13: thirteen students in their 
third year of Leeds University’s Fine Arts Course. They managed to raise about £1,600 in grant 
Rowe, 1974. I discuss Milgram’s experiments in some detail in my The Emotions: A Philosophical 
Exploration, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. For discussion of deception in social psychology, see, for 
example, A. Ortmann and R. Hertwig, ‘Is deception acceptable?’, American Psychologist 52, 1997, pp. 746-7.  
2  See their ‘“From Jerusalem to Jericho”: a study of situational and dispositional variables in helping 
behaviour’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27, 1973, pp. 100-8. I discuss this experiment in 
my On Personality, London: Routledge, 2004.  
3  As will emerge, there is a particular kind of deception in art which interests me here—the kind which has 
close parallels with deception in social psychology. I will not be concerned with other kinds of deception in 
art, such as trompe l’oeil, Duane Hanson’s lifelike figures, and the use of the unreliable narrator by writers of 
fiction.  
4  The Guardian October 11, 2002.  
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and sponsorship money, including £1,126 from the university’s student union, for their fine art 
degree project, which they titled Going Places. Quite what the artwork was going to be was a 
mystery to the sponsors. A week after the money had been raised, at the appointed time for the 
exhibition of the work, The Yorkshire Evening Post tells us what happened: ‘Tutors and other 
guests [including sponsors] at the opening of the Going Places exhibition at the East Leeds 
Studios arrived to find a bottle of sangria, drinking glasses, a stereo playing guitar music and a 
drama student dressed as an air hostess with a megaphone.’ Then a coach took the perplexed 
guests to Leeds Bradford Airport, where they witnessed the students, tanned and relaxed, 
coming through customs, apparently after a week in the Costa del Sol at the sponsors’ expense. 
The student union demanded its money back, saying that it had ‘been misled’; and another 
sponsor said ‘I feel I have been duped and I want my money back’.5 (In fact, there was a 
double deception: the students hid in their flats for a week, and got their tans from a tanning 
machine; there was no holiday.) 
These two works of art—let’s from now on think of them, the artworks, as performances6—
have more in common with the two experiments in social psychology than just the fact that they 
involve deception. Their success (as artwork, as experiment) depends on the success of the 
deception. The deception is intentional and is carefully planned and executed. The deception 
gives rise to potentially very strong emotions in those who are deceived. When wised up to the 
deception, those who are deceived realise these emotions to be unfounded. As a result of these 
emotional experiences, and of being wised up later, those who are deceived can find out 
troubling things about themselves: how gullible they are; how obedient they are; how quick they 
are to pompous and self-righteous anger; and so on.  
And yet, in spite of these parallels, the art world, artists, and philosophers of art, don’t seem 
to be at all troubled about the deception involved, whereas deception is a constant source of 
worry for social psychologists. Each of these responses might seem intuitively appropriate for its 
5  For reports, see the ‘official’ Leeds 13 website: 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/fine_art/arch/show/1998/goingplaces/index_frame.html 
6  For the idea that all works of art are performances, see David Davies, Art as Performance, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004.  
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sphere, but it is not easy to see what grounds these intuitions.  
 
II 
 
In order to make progress here, we need to think more about the following questions. Is 
there something ethically wrong with the conceptual art performances? If so, what is wrong 
about them, and is it a different kind or degree of wrongness to what’s wrong about the social 
psychology experiments?  
One easy answer, which has, as Bertrand Russell puts it, all the advantages of theft over 
honest toil, is to say that artists have free rein—they can’t do anything wrong ethically in the 
practice of their art: as artists they are, unlike the rest of us, exempt from ethical criticism. So 
there can be nothing wrong with the conceptual art performances. One might add to this the 
thought that, in contrast to the ethically ‘free’ artist, it is entirely appropriate for scientists, 
working in an institution such as a university, to have strict ethical rules controlling their 
deceptions. This would explain our intuitions. But, as it stands, I think that this answer is 
question-begging, although I will return to it at the end, and see if a fairly distant relative might 
have something going for it. 
Another possible answer would lead to the conclusion that we’re mistaken to have the 
intuitions that we do have. There is, according to this answer, an absolute prohibition against 
deception. The fact that an action involves deception is an ethical reason against doing that 
action, and this reason operates as a side-constraint, as we might say that the duty not to lie and 
the duty not to torture are side-constraints: one shouldn’t lie or torture people under any 
circumstance, whatever good may follow from it.7 Thus both conceptual artists and social 
psychologists should not only be worried about their deception, they should avoid deceiving 
people at all costs—whatever aesthetic or scientific benefits may follow from the deception. I 
can’t argue for it here, but I think this view is incorrect about deception in general: an act of 
deception should be permissible where it causes no harm, particularly to the person deceived, 
7  See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. 
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and it may even be the right thing to do where it promotes the good of the person deceived (as 
a ‘white lie’ might) or where it does good more widely.8  
However, in both the conceptual art performances and the social psychology experiments, 
harm is caused or is likely to be caused to those deceived. Both caused strong negative 
emotions in the people deceived, and, in the conceptual art performances as much as in the 
scientific experiments, these were real-life negative emotional responses to what was taken to 
be real-life situations: they weren’t what some have called ‘quasi-emotions’ of the kind we have 
in response to fictions (as when we feel grief at the suicide of Anna Karenin)9, nor were they 
simply feelings of aesthetic displeasure or distaste. So in this respect, in respect of the kind and 
degree of harm caused, the conceptual art performances are no different from the experiments 
in social psychology, and we have not yet found a satisfactory explanation of why our intuitions 
come up with diverging answers.  
Let’s try another way of thinking about deception: that, in those circumstances where an 
action’s being a deception is an ethical reason against that action, the reason operates, not as a 
side-constraint, but as a pro tanto reason. 10 A pro tanto reason is a reason that is to be 
‘weighed’ against other opposing reasons. For example, the fact that undertaking a long journey 
by car is tiring is a pro tanto reason against it, and this reason could be ‘outweighed’ by the fact 
that undertaking the journey will afford me the pleasure of seeing my girl friend; so all things 
considered the right thing to do is to undertake the journey. (I place ‘weigh’ in scare quotes 
because it must be remembered that the notion of weighing is a misleading metaphor: there is no 
single scale or measure of ‘weight’ that can be attached to all kinds of reasons, as some 
utilitarians believe.) So the fact that deception is involved in a conceptual art performance, and 
the fact that this deception causes or is likely to cause harm to those deceived, is a pro tanto 
ethical reason not to do the performance, but this reason can be ‘outweighed’ by other 
8  For discussion, see Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, 
especially Chapter 5. 
9  See for example Kendall Walton, ‘Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved by Fiction’, in 
Emotion and the Arts, eds M. Hjort and S. Laver, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 37-49. 
10  See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.  
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opposing reasons, such as, for example, the aesthetic merit of the performance.  
It is worth noting at this point that this seems to be how the American Psychological 
Association (the APA) sets things up in its code of ethical principles, in the section on deception 
and research. Whilst there is a clause that absolutely prohibits deception which is likely to cause 
‘physical pain or severe emotional distress’, there is also the following clause: ‘Psychologists do 
not conduct a study involving deception unless they have determined that the use of deceptive 
techniques is justified by the study’s significant prospective scientific, educational, or applied 
value and that effective nondeceptive alternative procedures are not feasible.’11 So it seems that 
social psychologists have procedures to ensure that the ethical reasons against their deceptive 
experiments are ‘outweighed’ by the opposing scientific or educational benefits. Now, are 
artists and the artworld justified in their apparent confidence that no such care need be taken 
with regard to performances of conceptual art which involve deception? Can they be sure that 
the potential aesthetic value of the performances of the works is clearly so great that it will 
always ‘outweigh’ the harm done as a result of the deception? Affirmative answers here are far 
from obvious. At this point we need to look in more detail at the relation between ethical and 
aesthetic values. 
 
III 
 
There is a general question in aesthetics, as to whether the ethical properties of an artwork 
impinge on its aesthetic value. This is usually discussed, and contested, in the context of the 
ethical properties of an artwork that are part of the content of the work—part of the artistic 
statement. For example, Berys Gaut has defended what he calls ethicism, according to which, 
‘if a work manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective’12; 
in other words, ethically reprehensible attitudes count pro tanto in an all-things-considered 
11  For the APA’s Ethical Principles and Code of Conduct, see their website, http://www.apa.org/ethics/ 
12  In ‘The ethical criticism of art’, in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. J. Levinson, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 182-203, at p. 182. For an overview, see Peter Lamarque, 
‘Reflections on current trends in aesthetics’, Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 1, pp.1-9. 
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aesthetic judgement. Thus, because Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will manifests an 
‘ethically reprehensible’ approval (or rather adoration) of Hitler, the work is to that extent 
aesthetically defective. It has been argued by others (including me), against ethicism, that the 
aesthetic value of some works of art is, in fact, increased rather than reduced by the ethically 
reprehensible attitudes manifested in the work, although Triumph of the Will is surely not one 
such work.13  
We now have to ask ourselves whether or not the deception involved in our conceptual art 
performances is part of the works’ content, and whether the deception could have aesthetic 
merit. Let’s first consider Sierra’s Space Closed; I will turn to the Leeds 13 performance later. 
In Sierra’s piece, the answer would seem to be that the deception is not part of the work’s 
content: the work—the performance—was about ‘not being able to get in somewhere’, and the 
deception was part of the medium by which Sierra articulated this artistic statement.14 However, 
our aesthetic appreciation of an artwork can, and typically does, extend beyond appreciation of 
the work’s content. For example, our appreciation of Van Gogh’s Sunflowers can include 
appreciation of the way in which Van Gogh worked the oils on the canvas to achieve his 
intended effect, but this working of oils is not part of the content of the work.15 Similarly here, 
we can appreciate the way in which Sierra set about his deception in order to achieve his 
audience’s feelings of frustration at not being able to get in somewhere. So I think that the 
deception involved in Sierra’s performance isn’t a reason at all for downgrading our all-things-
considered aesthetic judgement of the work. On the contrary, the fact that a deception—a 
successful deception, achieved with considerable panache, and with what one might properly 
call artistic skill—is involved in the performance is an aesthetic merit, increasing the aesthetic 
value of the performance. (It would be another matter if the deception were not necessary to the 
performance, or if the deception were clumsily executed.) 
13  See M. Kieran, ‘Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism’, in J. Bermúdez and S. Gardner 
(eds.), Art and Morality, London: Routledge, 2002, and my ‘Narrative, Emotion and Perspective’, in 
Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts, M. Kieran and D. Lopes eds, London: Routledge, 2003, pages 54-68.  
14  See the very helpful discussion of this in his Art as Performance, especially in Chapter 3. 
15  This is, as Davies points out, closely related to Richard Wollheim’s discussion of the ‘twofoldness’ of 
our interest in artworks: see Art as Performance pp. 55-6. 
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If this is right, then we really do have a substantive difference of principle between the ways 
in which deception enters into our evaluation of Sierra’ performance as compared with our 
evaluation of the two experiments in social psychology. In the latter, deception is always only an 
ethical demerit, and cannot in itself be of any scientific merit, whereas in this conceptual art 
performance, deception is both an ethical demerit and an aesthetic merit.  
We might, then, finally be in a position to see at least part of what grounds our intuitive 
responses to the deceptions of, on the one hand, conceptual artists, and, on the other hand, 
social psychologists. When Santiago Sierra reflected with pride on his deception and its 
effectiveness, he was right to do so: his emotion was appropriate to its object, for the deception 
was indeed an aesthetic merit of the way he effected his artistic statement. Whereas if a social 
psychologist were to be proud of his deception, we would think it inappropriate, for there is 
nothing scientifically meritorious about a deception as part of a scientific experiment: it can at 
best only be an ethically undesirable means to a scientifically good end. And if we were to laugh 
at the poor seminarian who stepped over his prone colleague whom he thought to be suffering, 
our laughter would be inappropriate in the context of such an experiment. (And that is not to say 
that laughter here isn’t both human and understandable.) 
So we can now also see what was perhaps appealing about the theft-over-honest-toil 
explanation that I put to one side. It’s not the artist’s having free rein, and the psychologist’s 
being part of an institution, that grounds our intuitions. Rather, it’s the fact that, for a scientist, a 
deception cannot have merit of any kind, scientific or aesthetic, whereas, for an artist, it can 
have aesthetic merit. The deception involved in conceptual artworks like Sierra’s is very much 
like the deception involved in a good April Fool joke: the deception adds to the aesthetic merit 
of the performance, in the one case the artwork-as-performance, in the other case the joke-as-
performance.  
 
IV 
 
The analogy with the April Fool joke brings out another respect in which the deception in 
Sierra’s conceptual  art performance is unlike the deception in the social psychology 
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experiments—a respect in which the conceptual art deception is ethically not as bad, even if the 
negative emotions which it causes are roughly of the same order. Although we might doubt the 
universality of Kant’s famous dictum, not to treat people ‘merely as a means’, the dictum has 
considerable grip where people are used as means towards some greater good of which they 
are, at best, only a remote part.16 And, in the social psychology experiments, this seems to be 
very much what is going on: the participants are being deceived—‘used’ one might say—as a 
means to the greater ‘cause’ of science; and the fact that they are called ‘participants’ these 
days, rather than ‘subjects’ as they were called in Milgram’s days, changes nothing. But, in 
Sierra’s work things are different: the viewers are not being deceived or ‘used’ in the greater 
cause of art; rather, their feelings of frustration, and, later, of being undeceived, is part of what is 
involved in their own overall appreciation of the conceptual art performance qua artwork.17 
And this is equally part of what’s involved in a successful April Fool joke: afterwards the person 
on whom the joke is played, with hindsight, delights in the ingenuity of the deception, in how she 
was taken in, and in how she reacted to being undeceived. This kind of April Fool joke 
contrasts with the kind of joke where someone is deceived—‘used’—as part of a joke at their 
expense, and as a means to the amusement of others. In such cases, the person deceived just 
feels resentment when wised up; others may be laughing (at him), but he isn’t amused and it isn’t 
really funny.  
So we now have two substantive reasons to explain our diverging intuitions about the use of 
deception in Sierra’s Space Closed and our two experiments in social psychology. First, the 
deception (as in good April Fool jokes) has aesthetic merit as well as ethical demerit, whereas 
in scientific experiments deception cannot have scientific merit. And secondly, the deception in 
the scientific experiments involves using the participants merely as a means, but the deception in 
16  See the discussion in Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness, especially p. 119.  
17  This raises some very interesting questions about how we can properly and most effectively appreciate 
works like Sierra’s Space Closed without ourselves having been one of those who were deceived. My own 
view, which I hope to develop elsewhere, is that some kind of perceptual imagining is required: either in-his -
shoes imagining, in which I (somehow) imagine myself feeling frustrated whilst not knowing what I do 
know—that I am being deceived; or third-personal imagining, in which I (somehow) perceptually imagine 
Sierra’s viewers feeling frustrated. There are close parallels with how we appreciate dramatic irony in fiction.  
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Sierra’s work does not. 
 
V 
 
Now I have some doubts about the Leeds 13 performance on both these scores. Let’s look 
at deception and aesthetic merit first. So far as I can make out, the deception would seem to be 
part of the content of the work, and in this respect it is unlike the Sierra. No doubt the 
deception was executed with care and skill, but this is not sufficient for it to add aesthetic merit 
to the work—think again of Leni Riefenstahl’s skill in portraying Hitler in such a glorious light. If 
what the work is about just is deception, I myself am unconvinced that Going Places is an 
interesting or valuable artwork. But let me leave that and turn to the second point. Here we 
should ask ourselves whether the sponsors were being deceived for our aesthetic appreciation 
or for theirs, and thus whether they were being ‘used’ in an ethically unacceptable way. The 
sponsors were left with just feelings of resentment at having been ‘misled’ or ‘duped’, and they 
(and we) might reasonably suspect that, if this was indeed the point of the work, and that their 
being deceived was part of what we (and not so much they) are meant to appreciate, then the 
Leeds 13 performance is like a joke at someone else’s expense: not a good thing to do. 
Perhaps, in such a case, the artworld and conceptual artists ought to worry more about 
deception that they seem to.18  
18  Many thanks to David Owens and to Sam Vice for helpful discussion. This paper is written as part of a 
one-year Arts and Humanities Research Board Innovation Award, ‘Perception, narrative discourse, and 
conceptual art’. 
